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it is too costly to positions further away. With “sincere” voting this ensures candidates
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1 Introduction
The citizen-candidate model of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) [OS from now on] and its com-
panion, the model in Besley and Coate (1997) [BC from now on], have become an important
reference in the literature of candidate entry in positive political economics. In OS voters are
“sincere”, whilst in BS they are free to vote whom they wish, but both integrate in one an
environment where individuals of the same population participate in elections and can become
candidates. Moreover, in BC the model allows for analyses of electoral competition in a multi-
dimensional space. However, both models rely on a restrictive assumption, contrary to a long
tradition in the formal study of political competition: candidates cannot commit to any policy
but their unique preferred point.
In the model the assumption is made because candidates care, apart from winning, for the
policy implemented. The argument is that, if a candidate has an ideal point, it is not credible
for him to promise that, once in office, he will not implement the policy he prefers. However,
this assumption runs in the face of any actual election where candidates express a preference for
some particular policy but are willing to compromise and implement some other point. That
is, there is room for commitment beyond a candidate’s expressed ideal point.
In this paper I introduce some flexibility in the range of policies that citizen-candidates can
commit to. However, I do not attempt to give a proper explanation of how far can candidates
commit to or compromise away from their ideal point. Instead, I intend to test the robustness of
OS to commitment beyond a single point without allowing costless commitment to any point.1
1With strategic voting, Feddersen, Sened, and Wright (1990) study entry with costless commitment, but
there candidates have no preferences for policies.
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Assuming commitment to any point might seem like a very strong assumption to make
when candidates have an ideal point. For this reason I consider a weaker form of commitment.
In particular, I assume that candidates can costlessly commit to other policies than their
preferred point, as long as they are (weakly) closer to it than the policy offered by any other
candidate. Instead, they face a prohibitive cost if they commit to a policy further away from
their ideal point than any other candidate’s policy. I label this notion “sincere” commitment.
With “sincere” voting it ensures that we consider the largest set of policies candidates commit
to whilst still voting for themselves. The environment is otherwise identical to that in OS. I
show that the assumed lack of commitment of candidates in their model is indeed a very strong
restriction to make: for population distributions which are constant (the Uniform) or with a
single peak (most used in practice), none of the multiple candidate equilibria they analyze
survives the relatively weak notion of commitment analyzed in this paper.
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2 The Model
A community of citizens distributed on a continuum have to select a policy on <. The distri-
bution of citizens is labelled F and it is assumed to have a single median, m. Each citizen has
linear preferences over policies indexed by an ideal point i. The distance of an implemented
policy x from this ideal point represents each citizen i’s utility: − |x− i| . As in OS, voting is
assumed to be “sincere”. That is, each of k candidates occupying a given position x get 1k of
the votes of those citizens with ideal points closer to x than any other policy.
Citizens cannot directly vote for a policy, but must vote for a citizen who commits to a
particular policy when deciding to run as a candidate. A candidate receives a benefit b from
winning the race. When deciding whether to enter the race or not, a citizen evaluates the cost
of entering, c. In addition, a citizen faces a cost
_
c if he or she enters at a policy further away
from his or her ideal point than the policy of another candidate. I assume it is very costly for
a citizen to incur in such action, i.e.
_
c >> 0. The winner is the candidate who obtains most
votes. If two or more candidates tie, then each wins with equal probability. If no citizen enters,
then they all obtain the payoff −_c. In analogy with OS, I call a distribution of candidates a
candidate configuration. In both here and OS, we look at pure strategy Nash equilibria of this
game with sincere voters.
Note that I assume candidates can commit, but as
_
c is assumed very large, commitment
is “sincere” in analogy with voting. In essence I want to see if allowing candidates to commit,
but remaining “sincere” as citizen-candidates, changes the predictions of the model in OS.
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3 Potential Types of Candidates in Equilibrium
Before comparing all the equilibria that arise in this model and all that arise in OS, it is
important to understand what types of candidate behavior could arise in both settings. For
this reason I first identify the different types of candidates that can potentially arise in an
equilibrium. Types of candidates are identified by how many of them can sit at a particular
position and their performance in the election: potentially they can lose, win, or tie. Obviously,
in a given equilibrium we cannot observe candidates who are tying and others who win, but the
particular structure assumed in OS and here (“sincere” voting and a one dimensional policy
space) restricts the types of candidates that can arise. I show that all the potential types that
arise in here can arise in OS and viceversa.
3.1 Winners
The first result we state is obvious: because of sincere voting, a winner can only sit on his own.
Lemma 3.1 Winners sit at a position on their own.
Proof. With sincere voting, if some other “winner” was sitting at the same position, they
would both be tying.
Things become more interesting with tying candidates.
3.2 Tying candidates
There can always be a candidate who is tying and sitting at some position by himself. However,
if voters are sincere, then there cannot be more than two tying candidates sitting at a given
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position. The reason is that if there were three or more, a new citizen could enter on some side
of that position and win the election. Moreover, even with only two tying candidates sitting
at a position, new entry is possible as long as the candidates do not sit at the median of their
voter support. That is, they cannot get support of more than one half on one side and less
than a half on the other.
Lemma 3.2 Candidates that are tying either sit at a position:
(i) on their own, or:
(ii) share it with another tying candidate, both sitting at the median of their voter support.
Proof. (i) If three or more candidates tie at a given position, then at least half of that support
must be on one of the two sides. It follows that if a citizen were to enter very close to them on
that side, he would win for sure.
(ii) The same logic as for (i) applies. With half the share of votes two tying candidates
get, it is enough to tie. However, if they are not sitting at the median of their support, then
there would be more than half support on one side and a citizen could enter on that side close
to them and win.
Finally, I consider the behavior of sure losers.
3.3 Sure losers
Sure losers come in a single type, as no more than a single candidate would sit at a given
position to lose.
Lemma 3.3 There is only one type of sure loser: one sitting on his own.
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Proof. (i) There can be no more than one candidate sitting at a given position.
In principle there could be more than one sure loser sitting at a position. However, the
only reason to remain in the race would be that if he were to jump out of the race or locate
elsewhere, then the remaining candidate(s) would not be sure losers anymore: they would either
tie or win. However, because of “sincere” commitment, the only positions a given candidate can
sit at must be weakly preferred to any other candidate’s position, so he would always benefit
if that position won with a positive probability. Thus, if by sitting at a given position he was
ensuring that position did not win with positive probability, he would jump out of the race.
(ii) There can be at least one candidate sitting at a given position.
Even if he is losing, by sitting at a given position a candidate can potentially make sure
that some votes that would otherwise go to some position he does not like do not end up
supporting it.
It is now necessary to compare the types of candidates that can arise in OS and compare
them to the four types found in this environment: winners, single tiers, twin tiers, and/or single
losers.
Proposition 1 The only potential equilibrium type of candidates in OS are winners, single
tiers, twin tiers, and/or single losers.
Proof. In OS, Lemma 1 shows that a sure loser will not share his position with another
candidate (who, by sincere voting, must also be a sure loser). Lemma 2 establishes that all the
other types of equilibrium candidate behavior mentioned above are also possible in OS.
Thus, all candidate types in this model can potentially arise in OS and viceversa.
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4 Equilibria
The argument I now build shows that all the multiple candidate equilibria analyzed in OS do
not survive in this environment. The argument is constructed in two steps. First I eliminate
candidate types that could potentially enter at the extreme of the candidate configuration under
any voter distribution F . Then I consider the possible configurations under a voter distribution
F with no peaks (i.e. the Uniform), and with a single peak (i.e. most distributions used in
practice). In OS only equilibria with less than five candidates are analyzed. None, but one of
those survives under these conditions.
4.1 Types at the extremes of a configuration
Lemma 4.1 There are no equilibria with sure losers or single tiers at the extremes of a candi-
date configuration.
Proof. First of all, note that if there was a sure loser or a single tier at the extreme, then there
are other candidates in the candidate configuration (sure winners or other tying candidates).
Given the above, a sure loser at the extreme would have two options to increase his utility.
Which one he picked would depend on whether he had the chance of tying or winning by moving
towards his neighboring candidate. If he had no chance, he could drop out of the race, save the
cost of entry, and increase the share of votes of his next most preferred candidate. Alternatively,
if he had the chance, he could move closer to the next candidate and grab that larger share of
votes. Either one of the two actions would increase his utility.
For a single tier at the extreme of the candidate configuration, as voters are continuously
distributed, he could win by moving epsilon towards the next candidate. This would also
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increase his utility.
It follows that equilibria can only consist of a single sure winner or twin tying candidates
at the extremes.
4.2 Equilibria with less than five candidates and voter distributions
with less than two peaks
In OS only equilibria with four or less candidates are analyzed. The next result shows that
all equilibria but one of those in their model are not equilibria in this model, when we only
consider voting distributions with no peaks (the Uniform distribution) or a single peak (most
distributions used in practice).
Proposition 2 For a voting distribution with one or no peaks, the only equilibrium with four
or less candidates is one with a single winner.
If Proposition 2 is true then, together with Lemma 4.1, we must conclude that there can be
no equilibria with twin tiers at the extremes consisting of four or less candidates if the voting
distribution has no peaks or a single peak. This is the first part of the proof of Proposition
2. The second shows that, for some parameter values, there is an equilibrium with a single
candidate running.
Proof. (i) There are no multiple candidate equilibria with four or less candidates when the
voting distribution is constant or single-peaked.
The minimum number of candidates for an equilibrium with twin tiers at the extremes
must be made of at least four candidates. I show that no configuration with four twin tying
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candidates is possible when the voting distribution is Uniform or single peaked.
i.i. Uniform. Divide the interval of voter support in 4. With twin tiers at the extremes of
the configuration, then one couple must sit at the lower quartile and the other at the upper
quartile. However, a candidate who enters at the median would win the election.
i.ii. Single Peaked. First note that, by Lemma 3.2. twin tiers must sit at the median of their
voter support.
Second, couples must enter on each side from the peak of the distribution. For consider
the interval in between both couples; because of sincere voting, in this interval the subinterval
of support of each couple is of equal length. But both couples must sit at the median of their
support, so they must get at least equal voter support in these subintervals. This is not possible
if the peak is not between both couples.
Finally, even if the peak is in between both couples, there is one candidate that can enter
between them and win for sure. Consider again the interval of support between both couples
and note that there is enough vote share for two candidates to tie. Moreover, from sincere
voting, if a new candidate entered somewhere in that interval, his interval of support would
be a half of this interval. If this candidate decides to sit at the peak of the distribution, then
he is getting more than enough to win. For he gets half of the interval where there is enough
votes for two to tie, and he is sitting at the point where there is most support and from where
support decreases monotonically towards both couples.
(ii) For some parameter values there is an equilibrium with a single candidate running. As
in OS, if b 6 2c then a candidate can sit at the median and win for sure, as no other candidate
finds it beneficial to enter at the median and tie (and if this new candidate entered anywhere
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else he would lose). Moreover, if b < c this single candidate can enter at a distance (c− b) /2
away from the median and it is still an equilibrium where he wins. Given that there is someone
already in the race, no candidate wants to enter to win. However, it is beneficial for the initial
candidate to enter because otherwise he faces the payoff −
_
c. That is,
_
c is large enough such
that there is always a candidate willing to internalize the externality imposed by no candidate
entering.
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5 Conclusion
I have shown that the multiple candidate equilibria analyzed in Osborne and Slivinski (1996),
i.e. those with four or less candidates, are not robust to a weak form of commitment. In this
case, when the voting distribution is constant or single-peaked, the citizen-candidate model has
a single prediction: a Nash equilibrium exists if b 6 2c where a single candidate enters. The
candidate sits at the median if b ∈ [c, 2c], and if b < c he can sit at any position not further
away from the median than (c− b) /2. This is the same single candidate equilibrium found in
their model.
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